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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TRANSFERS OF MINERAL RIGHTS IN 
SOIL DEPOSITS AS LEASE OR SALE-Petitioner executed a written agreement 
with a contractor in 1954 whereby the contractor acquired the right to 
enter petitioner's land and extract sand and gravel for a fixed amount per 
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cubic yard. This agreement was terminated in 1955 when the excavations 
had reached the desired level of street access. Petitioner had entered into 
a previous oral agreement in 1949 with a different party for the sale of the 
gravel on the same land down to the same elevation, but that party had 
not fully exploited the agreement.1 Petitioner claimed that the agreements 
were sales of sand and gravel in place down to the level required to make 
the land marketable. The Commissioner contended that these arrange-
ments were merely leases of the property with the payments constituting 
rent and therefore taxable as ordinary income. The Tax Court decided in 
favor of the Commissioner.2 On appeal, held, reversed. The terms of the 
1949 and 1954 agreements, considered in light of the intent and purpose 
of the parties, and the divestiture of any rights of petitioner in the sand 
and gravel after severance, indicate a transfer of all economic interest in 
the in-place mineral rights; therefore, the proceeds are to be treated as gain 
from the sale of a capital asset. Linehan v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 276 
(1st Cir. 1961). 
To obtain preferential capital gains treatment, there must be a "sale" 
or exchange of a capital asset.3 Generally, in determining whether there 
has been a sale, a court will apply the usual rules of intent, form, and 
purpose of the agreement to pass absolute title in the property immediately 
or at a future date in accordance with the terms of the contract.4 Thus, 
for example, gains from a conditional sales contract,5 or a business transfer 
with a lease-back provision6 are treated as gains from a sale or exchange 
of a capital asset. In most instances where full consideration is not pres-
ently given, as in the above examples, the vendor retains what might com-
monly be considered an economic or security interest in the property until 
the transaction is complete. Nevertheless, for tax purposes a sale has 
occurred as of the time of execution of the agreement. 
However, in situations involving mineral rights, the general criterion 
used to determine if a particular transaction is to be afforded capital gains 
treatment is whether the taxpayer has retained any "economic interest" 
in the mineral rights transferred.7 The courts reason that if any economic 
interest is retained there has not been a sale, and conversely if there has 
been a complete divestiture of all economic interest there must have been 
1 In addition there was an earlier oral agreement for the "sale" of the sand and 
gravel in 1943, the nature of which was undisclosed. 
2 Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960). 
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222. 
4 See, e.g., Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446, 465-66 (1949). 
G Truman Bowen, supra note 4. 
6 Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
7 See, e.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Palmer v. Bender, 
287 U.S. 551 (1933); Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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a sale; thus the two possibilities are considered mutually exclusive.a This 
concept of "economic interest" is, however, more restrictive than what one 
might normally consider the term to encompass. The taxpayer is held to 
have retained an economic interest in every case where he has retained any 
interest in the minerals still in place and has secured from any form of 
legal-relationship income derived from the extraction of the minerals to 
which he must look for a return on his capital.9 This test originated in 
cases involving the question of depletion allowances and has been applied 
by the courts in conjunction with the so-called "substance over form" 
theory.10 This has been especially apparent in cases dealing with oil de-
posits where the arrangements are often extremely complex, with the courts 
seemingly reluctant to bring in common-law property concepts which may 
tend to cloud ~e intricate relationship established by the contracts.11 
In situations involving soil deposits the taxpayer is generally seeking 
to establish a sale of the mineral deposits in order to obtain capital gain 
treatment since the depletion allowance in this area is relatively low. While 
the federal courts of appeal and district courts verbally adhere to the eco-
nomic interest and true substance tests carried over from the oil depletion 
cases, they seem to approach the problem as a general "sale or exchange" 
question. With an apparent attitude favoring taxpayers,12 these courts 
have stressed the factors present in the cases which would normally point 
to a sale rather than a relinquishment of all "economic interest." Reliance 
is placed on such indicia as the terms of the agreement set out in words 
of sale,1s the intent of the parties to sell,14 and large initial payments with 
fixed periodic payments as indicating an outright sale by the taxpayer with 
no further interest in development of the mineral resources.11i 
Until recently, the Tax Court had viewed some of these court decisions 
as erroneous.is It felt that a retained economic interest was present in some 
of the decisions since the agreements involved made provision to pay the 
consideration on a per unit basis as the mineral was extracted, the vendor 
s See Griffith v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. Wyo. 1960). See also 
Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 (1961). 
9 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Samuel 
L. Green, supra note 8, at 1071. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.611-l(b) (1962). 
10 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). 
11 See Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961). 
12 See Commissioner v. Remer, 260 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1958); Barker v. Commissioner, 
250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957); Gowans v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1957); 
Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957); Griffith v. 
United States, 180 F. Supp. 454 (D. Wyo. 1960); Bel v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 360 
(W. D. La. 1958) (for taxpayer). But see Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 
1957) (against taxpayer where the agreement was clearly i?- terms of a lease. 
13 Commissioner v. Remer, supra note 12; Bel v. Umted States, supra note 12. 
14 Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957). 
15 Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957). 
16 See, e.g., Robert M. Dann, 30 T.C. 499, 507 (1958). 
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retaining a reversion in the soil in place. Also, the taxpayer in such cases 
had no right to obligate the "purchaser" of the in-place deposits to move 
his deposits off the taxpayer's land under threat of an action for breach of 
contract.17 However, with the mounting pressure of decisions handed down 
by the district courts favorable to the transferor18 of the in-place mineral 
deposits and the reversals of Tax Court determinations in the courts of 
appeal,19 the Tax Court has recently altered its stand by accepting the deci-
sions of those tribunals as reconcilable.20 The test formulated to control all 
of the cases is now whether the contract itself resulted in a conveyance of the 
deposits "in place" so that the owner no longer retained any interest in 
such deposits.21 
However, basic differences between the Tax Court approach and that of 
the courts of appeals and the district courts still exist. The Tax Court looks 
to the economic interest, if any, retained by the taxpayer at the time of the 
agreement. Thus, if after the contract is executed the taxpayer no longer de-
pends on the extraction of minerals for his consideration (except as a conve-
nient method of determining the extent of his consideration where the quan-
tity of matter to be extracted is not definitely known), and where he may 
force the purchaser to remove all the in-place minerals purchased within a 
stated or reasonable time or be subject to a breach of contract action, then he 
is held to have retained no economic interest in the in-place minerals depos-
its.22 And since the two are mutually exclusive, it necessarily follows that 
if he has retained no economic interest then there must have been a sale of 
those deposits. The other federal courts usually take the opposite approach, 
relying mainly on form and intent to find a sale.23 If a sale is found they 
reason that there necessarily could not have been a retained economic in-
terest; and thus, the courts do not attempt to sift thoroughly the elements of 
the case to ascertain if any such interest does in fact exist.24 
The principal case purports to adopt the former approach by first deter-
17 E.g., Robert M. Dann, supra note 16. 
18 E.g., Griffith v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 454 (D. Wyo. 1960); Bel v. United 
States, 160 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1958). 
19 Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 24 T.C. ll60 (1955); 
Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957), reversing 
25 T.C. 223 (1955). 
20 See Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 (1961). 
21 Samuel L. Green, supra note 20, at 1071. 
22 See Robert M. Dann, 30 T.C. 499 (1958). See also Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 
(1961); Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960). 
23 See Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957); Bel v. United States, 160 
F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1958). 
24 In Baker v. Commissioner, supra note 23, at 198, the court indicates that at 
least the sand and gravel cases are to receive individual treatment stating, "Nor 
should our conclusion in this case [sand and gravel) be understood as an indication 
that we have any views concerning analogous or similar transactions in the field of 
oil, gas and mineral extraction." 
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mining whether there is any economic interest. However, the court argu-
ably misconstrued the real thrust of the test. This is evidenced by the 
importance attached to the fact that once the gravel was severed from the 
land, the taxpayer no longer had any interest in it. That observation, while 
true, is not determinative of the problem. What is essential is the nature 
of the taxpayer's rights, if any, to the in-place mineral deposits, or any 
portion thereof, the moment after the purported sale. The facts indicate 
that only the right to enter the premises and extract the gravel was sold, 
that there was no obligation upon the purchaser to remove all or any of 
the gravel "sold," and that the bulk of the consideration was dependent 
solely on the optional excavation and exploitation of the deposit. To this 
may be added the facts that the same general in-place sand and gravel 
deposit had been "sold" twice previously, that during one "sale" the price 
was raised from 10 to 18 cents per cubic yard, that a reversion was retained 
in the in-place gravel sold which was not extracted, and that a per unit basis 
of payment was not necessary to any of these agreements since the quantity 
of the in-place gravel was ascertainable.25 Thus, the principal case appar-
ently establishes a haven for those taxpayers who fail to put the transfer 
of their minerals in terms of an absolute sale, but who disclaim any interest 
in the mineral after severance. This deviation from the in-place oil deposit 
cases seems unwarranted, and review by the Supreme Court is necessary 
to clarify the situation.26 In addition the question remains whether re-
tained economic interest should be determinative of the issue or whether, 
for purpose of the capital gain provision, an economic interest may properly 
be retained after a sale. 
Philip Sotiroff 
25 See Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960). 
26 See Schoenbaum, Substance and Form in Assignments of In-Oil Rights and Other 
Mineral Interests, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX 443 (1959). 
